Hillsborough

[Slick 21]

As mentioned earlier, alot of peoples views of Liverpool fans are taken from that tradgedy. Apportioning blame was easier there though.

Respect to those who died at Hillsborough. They were totally innocent.

 

Mint post!

[Robertson9]

Jon-Paul Gilhooley (

[Legend Claws]

I remember being in our end at Sparta Prague thinking if we scored it would be carnage in the stands. We were up in the corner with people up on seats and folk in front of them etc.

[merseyjambo]

I know I'm starting to sound like a broken record here. However ignorance does need to be challenged:-

 

Go a read the Taylor Report into the disaster - I've provided a link within this thread. You will find that the Lord Chief Justice makes it clear that the ticketless fans theory is a minor issue and not the primary cause of the disaster. If anyone gets it tight from Taylor it is the South Yorkshire Police and their poor handling of the event.

 

I'll-founded statements such as the one you have made only served to perpetuate myth as fact and not only misleads those who do not have full knowledge of what happened but is also insulting to not only the friends and families who lost loved ones.

 

A genuine question - and I apologise if I come off a tad rude here as this is not the intention. Are you making this crass comment because you have some form of prejudice against Liverpudlians as a whole (and thus letting that get in the way of rational thought) or are you in complete ignorance of what happened that day but continue to peddle a myth out of sheer stupidity?

 

 

The myth in Athens last year was not perpetuated, numerous news programmes locally and nationally covered the fact that 100s of fans with tickets did not get into the game because ticketless fans had gotten into the ground. The policing in Athens that day was a joke and dangerous but it still does not disguise the fact that despite what happened in both Heysel & Hillsborough was repeated by fans charging.

 

The actual comment in Taylors report does make mention of fans without tickets trying to get into the game.

 

No one is saying they are fully responsible for what happened but they are part of a bigger picture.

 

As I said Matt, unless you have tried policing a football fixture, you have no idea what can and can't be heard on a radio

[Guest Dipped Flake]

Not read through this whole thread but will put my tuppence worth in. Although I don't support any english team, I suppose Liverpool would be the closest to being my favourite, because of the Scottish influence in the 70s and 80s. However, I must admit to getting really narked about the whole Hillsborough thing. My first gripe would be, why all the media attention around this, especially in Scotland, when there is next to nothing about the Ibrox disaster. I can't remember any big huha on the anniversary of that (I know there were 2 of them but the one in the 70s will be in the living memory of most posters). The other gripe is that this tragedy was caused, to some extent, by liverpool fans themselves. I know the stadium design, especially the fences, and the police were also to blame and I also know that the fans that died that day were 100% innocent but, the fact remains, that some liverpool fans have blood on their hands.

[Dusk_Till_Dawn]

Not read through this whole thread but will put my tuppence worth in. Although I don't support any english team, I suppose Liverpool would be the closest to being my favourite, because of the Scottish influence in the 70s and 80s. However, I must admit to getting really narked about the whole Hillsborough thing. My first gripe would be, why all the media attention around this, especially in Scotland, when there is next to nothing about the Ibrox disaster. I can't remember any big huha on the anniversary of that (I know there were 2 of them but the one in the 70s will be in the living memory of most posters). The other gripe is that this tragedy was caused, to some extent, by liverpool fans themselves. I know the stadium design, especially the fences, and the police were also to blame and I also know that the fans that died that day were 100% innocent but, the fact remains, that some liverpool fans have blood on their hands.

 

Listen, if you read the Taylor report you'll find comments refuting that. Look at the pictures of Lower Leppings - hundreds of fans crammed into two pens, hardly any fans in the others. It wasn't as if the whole terrace was rammed. The fact is that the lack of adequate sign-posting funnelled the fans down one tunnel into the two central pens, causing a crush. We'll never know exact figures but you can be sure that the vast majority of fans in there had tickets.

[Denny Crane]

As I said Matt, unless you have tried policing a football fixture, you have no idea what can and can't be heard on a radio

 

 

True, but it seems that some police forces are better at it than others.

 

From Hillsborough Justice Campaign website (I know some will say 'they have an agenda' - but then, most people have an agenda for their actions and statements).

 

"Superintendent Marshall was in overall command outside the ground. His record of the day reveals a heavy emphasis on the amount of alcohol being consumed by Liverpool fans. This emphasis was to become the main observation of the police version of events of the day and was the opposite of fans recollections and subsequent forensic evidence.

 

As conditions worsened fans were increasingly distressed. Those on the inside were struggling to breathe as the numbers swelled. Whilst on the outside the volume of those trying to enter at the Leppings lane end increased by the minute. An officer requested that the kick - off be delayed in order to reassure the crowd that there was no urgency. The request was denied. An inspector asked that the exit gates be opened in order to relieve the pressure outside. Marshall was reluctant to take this course of action because it would allow uncontrolled access to the stadium.

 

Fans accounts of the scenes outside the Leppings lane area point almost universally to a lack of organisation and control. Trapped in a bottleneck, quite literally, they had nowhere to go except where the momentum of the crowd led them. The fear of fans caught in this situation outside can only be matched by those struggling to survive on the inside.

 

 

Eventually Marshall radioed through to Chief Superintendent Duckenfield who was in overall command on the day (despite the fact that he had minimal experience of policing football and absolutely no experience of such a big game) and requested that the exit gates be opened. Duckenfield hesitated (he would later give evidence stating that he 'froze') but eventually gave the order: 'Open the gates'.

 

Once gate C had been opened police directed fans through the gate. The most obvious entrance to the terraces was through the tunnel opposite into pens 3 and 4. Evidence would later be given that in previous years police and/or stewards would stand at the entrance to the tunnel if these central pens had reached capacity and would direct fans to the side pens.

 

In 1989 however, no such direction took place as fans headed innocently into already overcrowded pens. It is quite incomprehensible that Duckenfield, failed to follow up the order to open gate C with instructions to allow for the swift increase in the volume of people entering that end of the ground. Indeed the reasoning capacity of Chief Superintendent David Duckenfield has to be seriously challenged when one considers his response to the situation in pens 3 and 4. Logic would inform the average person that the volume outside would be replicated inside once entrance was allowed and that therefore swift monitoring and control would be necessary if a catastrophe was to be averted. Logic however, does not seem to figure large in the consciousness of David Duckenfield. His response to seeing people spill out onto the perimeter track from the crushing in the pens was to call for reinforcements (including dog handlers) as he thought there was a pitch invasion!

 

 

This response of Duckenfield is even more obscene when it is realised that from his position in the control box he could clearly see the Leppings Lane end. Moreover, he had the advantage of CCTV with zoom facilities. His later testimony that he was unaware that people were suffering and dying becomes totally unbelievable to those of us who have visited that control box and know that it is possible see the colour of a persons eyes in pens 3 and 4 such was the power of the zoom facilities on the cameras. On the basis of his response given the carnage that could clearly be seen several theories have been postulated:

 

Duckenfield lacks the ability to reason at a very basic humanitarian level and therefore one has to ask does this reflect on the general standard of senior policing in Britain today.

Duckenfield was totally indifferent to the situation he was witnessing in the pens and ignored the plight of dying people.

Duckenfield was not in the control box at all, in which case where was he?

 

Inside the pens people were dead and dying. Faces were crushed up against the perimeter fencing, the vomit and blueness a clear sign of their condition. Fans were packed so tightly that many were dead standing up. Many still conscious were trying to break down the fencing with their hands. Those who had managed to climb over the fencing or escape when a perimeter gate was briefly opened also struggled to free their fellow fans. This was the sight that met the 'reinforcements' that had responded to Duckenfields' call to stem the 'pitch invasion'.

 

Clearly aware of the gravity of the situation many of these officers began to assist in trying to get people out. It has to be stated at this point that this is in stark contrast to many of the police officers positioned initially at the perimeter fencing who ignored the obvious signs of distress and the screams for help even though they were literally an arms length from those dying. It also contrasts with the actions of those other officers who pushed fans back inside the pens when from which they had momentarily escaped when the perimeter gate opened. These actions more than anything else illustrate graphically the prevailing attitude to football supporters by the police as an organisation. The only rational explanation for the actions of these officers was, that deep within their psyche, police training had conditioned them to view crowds in terms of crowd control rather than crowd safety. Their actions during the Miners Strike of 1984 and the Trafalgar Square Poll Tax demonstrations support this view. They had also been conditioned to inextricably link football supporters and hooliganism. As we now know this 'conditioning' had the disastrous consequence of leading to the biggest sporting disaster in British history.

 

 

The pitch soon resembled a battleground as bodies were laid out on the ground and the injured wandered around dazed and confused. Fans sought desperately to save lives. Apart from pleading with police to recognise the seriousness of the situation, they tore down advertising hoardings to act as stretchers and ferried fans to the far end of the pitch in the hope that they would receive treatment. Although ill - equipped to do so many fans attempted to resuscitate people themselves in the absence of professional medical assistance.

 

It can be argued that to refer to a police response is something of a misnomer and it would be more appropriate to refer to 'the lack of a police response'. Both eye witness and visual evidence clearly shows the poor reaction of the police to an emerging disaster. It shows that their training had centred around crowd control as opposed to crowd safety. There can be no other explanation as to why senior officers failed to respond to the obvious distress of so many and subsequently why police formed a cordon across the halfway line when fans were ripping down hoardings to use as make shift stretchers to ferry the dead and injured. At one point when a perimeter gate opened under the force of the crush several fans managed to get out yet officers on duty at that point literally pushed them back in. Later at the resumed inquests those officers would give evidence affirming this fact. Even with hindsight they displayed no remorse for their actions. Of course the real issue here is the training of these officers as clearly they either ignored or failed to recognise the obvious distress of those just feet away from them.

 

The officer in charge on the day was in a control room that looked onto the Leppings Lane terracing. It also had the benefit of TV cameras with zoom facilities. To this day the ability of this officer has been questioned. Not only would he have been able to see the scene at the Leppings Lane end with the naked eye but he also had the added advantage of zoom facilities so powerful that it was possible to see the colour of a persons' eyes. There are those that have argued that the only rational reason for his lack of action was that he was not in the control room at all…. He was later to give evidence saying that he 'froze'. This begs the question why was such an inexperienced (although senior) officer put in charge of such a major event? Even when he realised that something was wrong his response was to send for reinforcements (including dog handlers) as if he had a crowd control situation!

 

The entire police response to the Hillsborough Disaster was appalling. Even though there were individual officers who assisted in attempting to save lives, nevertheless at an organisational level the police failed not just miserably but disastrously and (in the eyes of many) criminally. How else can the response be justified? Why did police push fans back into the pens? Why were dog handlers sent for? Why was a cordon of police formed across the halfway line? Why did police stand around doing nothing while fans rushed to save live? To summarise, why was there such a waste of valuable human resources at such a vital time?"